Ressourcen und weiterführende Lektüre

Kapitel 1: Einführung in den Utilitarismus

Ressourcen für Einführung in den Utilitarismus:

Einführung

• Utilitarianism: Crash Course Philosophy #36
• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum.
• Kwame Anthony Appiah. What is Utilitarianism?, Royal Institute of Philosophy 15-Minute Masterclass.

Die Klassiker

• Jeremy Bentham (1789). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.
• John Stuart Mill (1863). Utilitarianism.
• Henry Sidgwick (1874). The Methods of Ethics.

Weiterführende Lektüre

• Julia Driver (2014). The History of Utilitarianism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (Hrsg.).
• Bart Schultz (2017). The Happiness Philosophers: The Lives and Works of the Great Utilitarians. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• James Crimmins (2017). The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism. Bloomsbury.
• Derek Parfit (2011/17). On What Matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Yew-Kwang Ng (1990). Welfarism and Utilitarianism: A Rehabilitation. Utilitas. 2(2): 171–193.

Kapitel 2: Elemente und Arten des Utilitarismus

Ressourcen für Elemente und Arten des Utilitarismus:

Konsequentialismus

• Julia Driver (2011). Consequentialism, New Problems of Philosophy. José Luis Bermúdez (Hrsg.). Abingdon: Routledge.
• Samuel Scheffler (1994). The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2015). Consequentialism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (Hrsg.).

Welfarismus und Theorien über Wohlergehen

• Roger Crisp (2017). Well-Being. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (Hrsg).
• Nils Holtug (2003). Welfarism – The Very Idea. Utilitas. 15(2): 151–174.
• Shelly Kagan (1992). The Limits of Well-being. Social Philosophy & Policy. 9(2): 169–189.

Unparteilichkeit

• Robert Goodin (1988). What is so special about our fellow countrymen? Ethics, 98 (4): 663-686.
• Troy Jollimore (2018). Impartiality. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (Hrsg).

Aggregationismus

• John Broome (1991). Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty, and Time. London: Wiley-Blackwell. Kapitel 4 and 10.
• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. Kapitel 5: Utilitarian Aggregation.
• Alastair Norcross (1997). Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 26(2): 135–167.

Hedonismus

• Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 73(3): 619–645.
• Fred Feldman (2004). Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism. Oxford University Press.
• Shelly Kagan (1992).The Limits of Well-being. Social Philosophy & Policy. 9(2): 169–189.
• Ole Martin Moen (2016). An Argument for Hedonism. The Journal of Value Inquiry. 50: 267–281.
• Andrew Moore (2019). Hedonism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (Hrsg).

Populationsethik

• Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg, & Torbjörn Tännsjö (2017). The Repugnant Conclusion. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (Hrsg).
• Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). Future generations: A challenge for moral theory. PhD Dissertation, Uppsala University.
• Hilary Greaves (2017). Population Axiology. Philosophy Compass. 12(11).
• Johan E. Gustafsson (2022). Our Intuitive Grasp of the Repugnant Conclusion. In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell und Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (Hrsg.), The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford University Press.
• Michael Huemer (2008). In Defence of Repugnance. Mind. 117(468): 899-933.
• Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Maximierender, Satisfaktions- und skalarer Utilitarismus

• Ben Bradley (2006). Against Satisficing Consequentialism. Utilitas. 18(2): 97–108.
• Richard Y. Chappell (2020). Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good. In Douglas W. Portmore (Hrsg.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 498–512.
• Richard Y. Chappell (2019). Willpower Satisficing. Noûs 53(2): 251–265.
• Alastair Norcross (2020). Morality by Degrees: Reasons Without Demands. Oxford University Press.
• Alastair Norcross (2006). The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism. In Henry West (Hrsg.), The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism. Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 217–32.
• Neil Sinhababu (2018). Scalar consequentialism the right way. Philosophical Studies. 175: 3131–3144.

Erwartungs-Utilitarismus versus objektiver Utilitarismus

• Roger Crisp (1997). Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism. Routledge, pp. 99–101.
• Peter A. Graham (2021). Subjective Versus Objective Moral Wrongness. Cambridge University Press.
• Frank Jackson (1991). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. Ethics, 101(3): 461–482.

Mehrstufiger versus einstufiger Utilitarismus

• Roger Crisp (1997). Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism. Routledge, pp. 105–112.
• Richard M. Hare (1981). Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. Oxford University Press.
• Peter Railton (1984). Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 13(2): 134–171.

Globaler Utilitarismus versus hybrider Utilitarismus

• Brian McElwee (2020). The Ambitions of Consequentialism. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 17(2).
• Richard Y. Chappell (2012). Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive. Philosophical Quarterly. 62(249): 684–704.
• Richard Y. Chappell. Consequentialism: Core and Expansion, kommend in D. Copp, C. Rosati und T. Rulli (Hrsg.). The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press.
• Toby Ord (2009). Beyond Action: Applying Consequentialism to Decision Making and Motivation. DPhil Thesis, University of Oxford.
• Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (2000). Global Consequentialism. In Hooker, B., Mason, E. & Miller, D. (Hrsg.). Morality, Rules and Consequences: A Critical Reader. Edinburgh University Press.

Kapitel 3: Argumente für Utilitarismus

Ressourcen für Argumente für Utilitarismus:

• John Broome (1987). Utilitarianism and Expected Utility, The Journal of Philosophy 84 (8): 405–422.
• John Broome (1991). Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Blackwell.
• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. Continuum.
• Robert Goodin (1995). Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
• Caspar Hare (2016). Should We Wish Well to All?, Philosophical Review 125(4): 451–472.
• John C. Harsanyi (1955). Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, The Journal of Political Economy 63 (4): 309–321.
• John C. Harsanyi (1977). Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge University Press.
• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). Kapitel 2: Justifications, in Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
• J.J.C. Smart (1973). An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics, in J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press.

Kapitel 4: Theorien über Wohlergehen

Ressourcen für Theorien über Wohlergehen:

Einführung

• Roger Crisp (2017). Well-Being. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (Hrsg.).
• Shelly Kagan (1992). The Limits of Well-being. Social Philosophy & Policy. 9(2): 169–189.
• Eden Lin (2022). Well‐being, part 1: The concept of well‐being. Philosophy Compass. 17(2).
• Eden Lin (2022). Well‐being, part 2: Theories of well‐being. Philosophy Compass. 17(2).
• Derek Parfit (1984). Appendix I: What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Welfarismus

• Nils Holtug (2003). Welfarism – The Very Idea. Utilitas. 15(2): 151–174.
• Andrew Moore & Roger Crisp (1996). Welfarism in moral theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 74(4): 598–613.

Hedonismus

• Andrew Moore (2019). Hedonism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (Hrsg.).
• Ole Martin Moen (2016). An Argument for Hedonism. The Journal of Value Inquiry. 50: 267–281 (2016).
• Ivar Labukt (2012). Hedonic Tone and the Heterogeneity of Pleasure. Utilitas. 24(2): 172–199.
• Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 73(3): 619–645.
• Fred Feldman (2004). Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wunscherfüllungstheorien

• Chris Heathwood (2015). Desire-fulfillment theory, in Guy Fletcher (Hrsg.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. London: Routledge.
• Peter Singer (2011). Kapitel 1: About Ethics, in Practical Ethics (3. Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Chris Heathwood (2006). Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism. Philosophical Studies. 128: 539–563.
• Mark Murphy (2002). The Simple Desire‐Fulfillment Theory. Noûs. 33(2): 247–272.
• Wlodek Rabinowicz & Jan Österberg (1996). Value Based on Preferences: On Two Interpretations of Preference Utilitarianism. Economics and Philosophy. 12(1): 1–27.

Objektive-Listen-Theorien

• Guy Fletcher (2013). A Fresh Start for an Objective List Theory of Well-Being. Utilitas. 25(2): 206–220.
• James Griffin (1986). Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Eden Lin (2014). Pluralism about Well-Being. Philosophical Perspectives. 28(1): 127–154.

Kapitel 5: Populationsethik

Ressourcen für Populationsethik:

Allgemeine Abhandlungen zu Populationsethik

• Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). Future Generations: A Challenge for Moral Theory. PhD Dissertation, Uppsala University.
• Richard Y. Chappell (2021). Abschnitt 7: Population Ethics, Parfit’s Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Hilary Greaves (2017). Population Axiology. Philosophy Compass. 12(11).
• Derek Parfit (1984). Teil Vier: Future Generations, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Die Gesamtansicht und die abstoßende Schlussfolgerung

• Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg & Torbjörn Tännsjö (2017). The Repugnant Conclusion. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (Hrsg.).
• Gustaf Arrhenius (2003). The Very Repugnant Conclusion. In Krister Segerberg & Ryszard Sliwinski (Hrsg.), Logic, Law, Morality: Thirteen Essays in Practical Philosophy in Honour of Lennart Åqvist. Uppsala, pp. 29–44.
• Johan E. Gustafsson (2022). Our Intuitive Grasp of the Repugnant Conclusion. In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell und Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (Hrsg.), The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford University Press.
• Spears, D. & Budolfson, M. (2021). Repugnant conclusions. Social Choice and Welfare. 28.
• Michael Huemer (2008). In Defence of Repugnance. Mind. 117(468): 899–933.
• Torbjörn Tännsjö (2002). Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion. Utilitas. 14(3): 339–359.
• Stéphane Zuber et al. (2021). What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion? Utilitas. 33(4): 379–383.

Variabler-Wert-Theorien

• Theodore Sider (1991). Might Theory X be a theory of diminishing marginal value? Analysis. 51(4): 265–271.
• Thomas Hurka (1983). Value and Population Size. Ethics, 93(3): 496–507.

Kritisches-Level-Theorien und Kritische-Spanne-Theorien

• Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert & David J. Donaldson (1995). Intertemporal Population Ethics: Critical-Level Utilitarian Principles. Econometrica, 63(6): 1303–1320.
• Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert & David J. Donaldson (2005). Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics, and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• John Broome (2004). Weighing Lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Johan Gustafsson (2020). Population axiology and the possibility of a fourth category of absolute value. Economics & Philosophy, 36: 81–110.

Neutralitätsintuition

• Jeff McMahan (2013). Causing People to Exist and Saving People’s Lives. Journal of Ethics. 17: 5–35.
• Wlodek Rabinowicz (2009). Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality. Philosophical Issues. 19(1): 389–411.
• Kryster Bykvist (2007). The Benefits of Coming into Existence. Philosophical Studies. 135(3), 335–362.
• John Broome (2005). Should We Value Population?. The Journal of Political Philosophy. 13(4): 399–413.
• Elizabeth Harman (2004). Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?. Philosophical Perspectives. 18: 89–113.

Personenbezogene Sichtweisen und die Asymmetrie

• Gustaf Arrhenius (2009). Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?, in Roberts, M.A., Wasserman, D.T. (Hrsg.) Harming Future Persons. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine. 35. Springer, Dordrecht.
• Daniel Cohen (2019). An Actualist Explanation of the Procreation Asymmetry. Utilitas. 32(1): 70–89.
• Johann Frick (2014). ‘Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People’: A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics. Doktorarbeit, Harvard University.
• Johann Frick (2020). Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry. Philosophical Perspectives. 34(1): 53–87
• Caspar Hare (2007). Voices from Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist?. Ethics, 117(3): 498–523.
• Jan Narveson (1973). Moral Problems of Population. The Monist. 57(1): 62–86.
• Josh Parsons (2002). Axiological Actualism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 80(2): 137–147.
• Melinda A. Roberts (2002). A New Way of Doing the Best That We Can: Person-Based Consequentialism and the Equality Problem. Ethics, 112(2): 315–350.

Praktische Implikationen populationsethischer Theorien

• Toby Ord (2020). The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity. Bloomsbury Publishing.
• David Althaus & Lukas Gloor (2018). Reducing Risks of Astronomical Suffering: a Neglected Priority. Center on Long-Term Risk.
• Nick Beckstead (2013). On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far-Future. PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University.
• William MacAskill (2022). What We Owe the Future. Basic Books.

Unmöglichkeitstheoreme in der Populationsethik

• Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies. Economics and Philosophy. 16(2): 247–266.
• Philip Kitcher (2000). Parfit’s Puzzle. Noûs. 34(4): 550–577.
• Erik Carlson (1998). Mere addition and two trilemmas of population ethics. Economics and Philosophy. 14(2): 283–306.
• Yew-Kwang Ng (1989). What should we do about future generations? Impossibility of Parfit’s Theory X. Economics and Philosophy. 5(2): 235–253.

Kapitel 6: Utilitarismus und Praktische Ethik

Ressourcen für Utilitarismus und Praktische Ethik:

Gibt es einen Unterschied zwischen dem Zufügen und dem Zulassen von Schaden?

• Fiona Woollard & Frances Howard-Snyder (2016). Doing vs. Allowing Harm. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (Hrsg.).
• Jonathan Bennett (1995). The Act Itself. Oxford University Press.

Der sich weitende moralische Kreis

• Peter Singer (1997). The Drowning Child and the Expanding Circle. New Internationalist.
• Peter Singer (1981). The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kosmopolitismus: den moralischen Kreis geographisch weiter fassen

• Poverty & Our Response to It: Crash Course Philosophy #44
• Peter Singer (2009). The Life You Can Save. New York: Penguin Random House. (Sowohl das Original als auch die deutsche Fassung mit dem Titel Leben retten! stehen zum kostenlosen Download bereit.)
• Samuel Scheffler (1999). Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism. Utilitas. 11(3): 255–276.

Anti-Speziesismus: den moralischen Kreis für andere Spezies öffnen

• Non-Human Animals: Crash Course Philosophy #42
• Peter Singer (1975). Animal Liberation. New York: HarperCollins.
• Jeff McMahan (2002). Animals. In R. G. Frey and Christopher Wellman (Hrsg.), The Blackwell Companion to Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 525–536.
• Jeff Sebo (2019). A Utilitarian Case for Animal Rights. Effective Altruism Global.

Longtermism: den moralischen Kreis zeitlich weiter fassen

• Toby Ord (2020). The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
• Hilary Greaves & William MacAskill (2019). The Case for Strong Longtermism. Global Priorities Institute.
• Nick Beckstead (2013). On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far-Future. PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University.
• Nick Bostrom (2003). Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development. Utilitas. 15(3): 308–314.
• William MacAskill (2022). What We Owe the Future. Basic Books.

Respektieren vernünftiger moralischer Normen

• Allan Gibbard (1984). Utilitarianism and Human Rights. Social Philosophy and Policy, 1(2): 92–102.
• R.M. Hare (1981). Moral Thinking. Oxford University Press.
• J.L. Mackie (1985). Rights, Utility, and Universalization. In R.G. Frey (Hrsg.) Utility and Rights. Basil Blackwell.
• Philip Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan (1986). Restrictive Consequentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(4): 438–455.

Kapitel 7: Utilitarismus-nahe Alternativen

Ressourcen für Utilitarismus-nahe Alternativen:

Jenseits des Welfarismus

• Richard Routley (1973). Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?. Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, 1: 205–210.
• Elizabeth Anderson (1999). What is the Point of Equality? Ethics 109 (2): 287–337.
• Derek Parfit (1997). Equality and Priority. Ratio, 10(3): 202–221.

Prioritarismus

• Derek Parfit (1997). Equality and Priority. Ratio, 10(3): 202–221.
• Johan E. Gustafsson (2021). Ex-Ante Prioritarianism Violates Sequential Ex‑Ante Pareto. Utilitas, 1–11.
• Joshua Greene & Jonathan Baron (2001). Intuitions about Declining Marginal Utility. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 14: 243–55.

Vom Verdienen ausgehende Ansichten

• Fred Feldman (1995). Adjusting utility for justice: A consequentialist reply to the objection from justice. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55(3): 567–585.

Egoismus und Parteilichkeit

• Simon Keller (2013). Partiality. Princeton University Press.
• Derek Parfit (1984). Teil Zwei: Rationality and Time, Reasons and Persons. Clarendon Press.
• Andreas Mogensen (2022). The only ethical argument for positive 𝛿?. Philosophical Studies 179: 2731–2750.
• Troy Jollimore (2018). Impartiality. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (Hrsg.).
• Robert Goodin (1988). What is so special about our fellow countrymen? Ethics 98(4): 663–686.

Jenseits des Konsequentialismus

• John Taurek (1977). Should the numbers count?. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6(4): 293–316.
• David Ross (1930). The Right and the Good. Clarendon Press.
• Elizabeth Ashford (2003) The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism. Ethics 113(2): 273–302.

Kapitel 8: Einwände gegen den Utilitarismus und Antworten

Ressourcen für Einwände gegen den Utilitarismus und Antworten:

Allgemein

• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kapitel 4: Objections.
• J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams (1973). Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Der Einwand bezüglich der Rechte von Personen

• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kapitel 4: Objections, Abschnitt „Does utilitarianism tell us to act immorally?“.
• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. Kapitel 8: Is Utilitarianism too Permissive?
• Shelly Kagan (1998). Normative Ethics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Kapitel 3.
• Shelly Kagan (1989). The Limits of Morality. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Eduardo Rivera-López (2012). The Moral Murderer. A (more) effective counterexample to consequentialism. Ratio, 25(3): 307–325.
• Judith Jarvis Thomson (1976). Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem. The Monist. 59 (2): 204–17
• Scott Woodcock (2017). When Will a Consequentialist Push You in Front of a Trolley? Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 95 (2): 299–316.

Der „bloße Mittel“-Einwand

• Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Sommer 2019-Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Hrsg.).
• Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters: Vol 1. Oxford University Press. Kapitel 9: Merely as a Means.

Der Einwand von der Getrenntheit von Personen

• David Brink (2020). Consequentialism, the Separateness of Persons, and Aggregation. In Douglas W. Portmore (Hrsg.) The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
• Richard Y. Chappell (2021). Parfit’s Ethics, Abschnitt 3.2. Cambridge University Press.
• Richard Y. Chappell (2015). Value Receptacles. Noûs, 49(2): 322–332.
• G.A. Cohen (2011). Rescuing Conservatism: A Defense of Existing Value. In R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar und Samuel Freeman (Hrsg.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon. Oxford University Press.
• Stephan Dickert, Daniel Västfjäll, Janet Kleber und Paul Slovic (2015). Scope insensitivity: The limits of intuitive valuation of human lives in public policy. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 4(3): 248–255.
• Robert Nozick (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books.
• Derek Parfit (2003). Justifiability to Each Person. Ratio, 16(4): 368–390
• Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. und Jeffrey Paul (Hrsg.) (2010). Utilitarianism: The Aggregation Question. Cambridge University Press.
• John Rawls (1971). A Theory of Justice. Belknap Press.
• T.M. Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press.

Der Einwand, Utilitarismus sei zu fordernd

• Brian Berkey (2016). The Demandingness of Morality: Toward a Reflective Equilibrium. Philosophical Studies. 173(11): 3015–3035.
• Krister Bykvist (2010). Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum. Kapitel 7: Is Utilitarianism too Demanding?
• Shelly Kagan (1984). Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent work on the Limits of Obligation. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 13(3): 239–254.
• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2014). The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 317–336.
• Peter Singer (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(3): 229–243.
• David Sobel (2007). The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection. Philosophers’ Imprint. 7(8): 1–17.
• Susan Wolf (1982). Moral Saints. The Journal of Philosophy. 79(8): 419–434.

Der Einwand der Entfremdung

• Richard Y. Chappell, (2021). The Right Wrong-Makers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103(2): 426–440.
• Barry Maguire & Calvin Baker (2020). The Alienation Objection to Consequentialism, in D. Portmore (Hrsg.) The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
• Philip Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan (1986). Restrictive Consequentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(4): 438–455.
• Peter Railton (1984). Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13(2): 134–171.
• Michael Stocker (1976). The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories. Journal of Philosophy, 73: 453–466.
• Bernard Williams (1981). Persons, Character and Morality. In Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973–1980, Cambridge University Press.

Der Einwand der besonderen Verpflichtungen

• Jim A.C. Everett, Nadira S. Faber, Julian Savulescu und Molly J. Crockett (2018). The costs of being consequentialist: Social inference from instrumental harm and impartial beneficence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 79: 200–216.
• Robert Goodin (1988). What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen? Ethics, 98(4): 663–686.
• Frank Jackson (1991). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. Ethics, 101(3): 461–482.
• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2012). The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason. _Ethics, _123(1): 9–31.
• Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Der Gleichheits-Einwand

• Roger Crisp (2003). Equality, Priority, and Compassion. Ethics, 113(4): 745–763.
• Toby Ord (2015). A New Counterexample to Prioritarianism. Utilitas, 27(3): 298–302.
• Derek Parfit (1997). Equality and Priority. Ratio, 10(3): 202–221.
• Larry Temkin (1993). Inequality. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Larry Temkin (2003). Equality, Priority or What?. Economics and Philosophy, 19(1): 61–87.

Der Einwand von der Ahnungslosigkeit

• Joanna Burch-Brown (2014). Clues for Consequentialists. Utilitas, 26(1): 105–119.
• Hilary Greaves (2016). Cluelessness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 116(3): 311–339.
• James Lenman (2000). Consequentialism and Cluelessness. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29(4): 342–370.
• Andreas Mogensen (2021). Maximal Cluelessness. The Philosophical Quarterly, 71: 141–162.
• Andreas Mogensen & William MacAskill (2021). The Paralysis Argument. Philosophers’ Imprint 21 (15): 1–17.
• David Thorstad und Andreas Mogensen (2020). Heuristics for clueless agents: how to get away with ignoring what matters most in ordinary decision-making. GPI Working Paper 2-2020.

Der Einwand von der Missbräuchlichkeit

• Allan Gibbard (1984). Utilitarianism and Human Rights. Social Philosophy and Policy, 1(2): 92–102.
• R.M. Hare (1981). Moral Thinking. Oxford University Press.
• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2010). Secrecy in Consequentialism: A defence of esoteric morality. Ratio, 23(1): 34–58.
• J.L. Mackie (1985). Rights, Utility, and Universalization. In R.G. Frey (Hrsg.) Utility and Rights. Basil Blackwell.
• Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons, Teil Eins: Self-Defeating Theories. Clarendon Press.
• Philip Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan (1986). Restrictive Consequentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(4): 438–455.
• Bernard Williams (1973). A Critique of Utilitarianism. In J.J.C Smart & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press.

Utilitarismus als Handlungsgrundlage

Ressourcen für Utilitarismus als Handlungsgrundlage:

Allgemein

• Peter Singer (2011). Practical Ethics, 3. Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). Kapitel 6: Utilitarianism in Action, Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Effektiver Altruismus

• William MacAskill (2019). Effective Altruism. The Norton Introduction to Ethics, Elizabeth Harman & Alex Guerrero (Hrsg.).¹
• William MacAskill (2015). Doing Good Better: Effective Altruism and How You Can Make a Difference. New York: Penguin Random House. Deutsche Ausgabe: William MacAskill (2016), Stephan Gebauer (Übersetzer). Gutes besser tun: Wie wir mit effektivem Altruismus die Welt verändern können. Berlin: Ullstein.
• William MacAskill (2018). Was sind die wichtigsten moralischen Probleme unserer Zeit? TED.
• Peter Singer (2013). The Why and How of Effective Altruism. TED.
• Webseiten und Organisationen zu Effektivem Altruismus:
  • effektiveraltruismus.de: Webseite, die (auf Deutsch) Ressourcen zu Effektivem Altruismus und Informationen zur deutschen Effektiver Altruismus-Bewegung zur Verfügung stellt.
  • Effectivealtruism.org: Webseite, die (auf Englisch) Ressourcen zu Effektivem Altruismus zur Verfügung stellt.
  • 80,000 Hours: gemeinnützige Organisation, die talentierten Menschen dabei helfen will, mit ihrer Karriere möglichst viel Gutes zu tun.
  • Giving What We Can: eine Gemeinschaft von Menschen, die sich verpflichtet haben, 10 % ihres Lebenseinkommens an effektive Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen zu spenden.
  • Effektiv Spenden: gemeinnützige Spendenplattform, die Informationen und administrative Hilfe für Spenden an effektive Hilfsorganisationen bereitstellt.
  • Charity Entrepreneurship: ein Inkubator für Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen, der jedes Jahr bei der Gründung mehrerer hochwirksamer Wohltätigkeitsorganisationen hilft.
• Podcasts über Effektiven Altruismus und Utilitarismus:
  • Stephan Dalügge. Prioritäten.
  • Effektiver Altruismus: Artikel.
  • Effective Altruism: An Introduction. 80,000 Hours Podcast.
  • William MacAskill (2020). Doing Good. Making Sense Podcast with Sam Harris.
  • Peter Singer (2016). What is Moral Progress?. Making Sense Podcast with Sam Harris.
  • Gus Docker. Utilitarian Podcast.

Globale Gesundheit und Entwicklung

• Peter Singer (2019). The Life You Can Save, aktualisierte Ausgabe zum 10-jährigen Jubiläum. New York: Penguin Random House. (Sowohl das Original als auch die deutsche Fassung mit dem Titel Leben retten! stehen zum kostenlosen Download bereit.)
• Toby Ord (2019).The Moral Imperative toward Cost-Effectiveness in Global Health, in Greaves, H. (Hrsg.) Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Peter Unger (1996). Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wohlergehen von Nutztieren

• Tyler John and Jeff Sebo (2020). Consequentialism and Nonhuman Animals. In The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism, Douglas W. Portmore (Hrsg.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Peter Singer (2023). A modern argument for the rights of animals. TED.
• Lewis Bollard (2021). Lewis Bollard on big wins against factory farming and how they happened. 80,000 Hours Podcast with Rob Wiblin.
• Jess Whittlestone (2017). Animal Welfare. Effective Altruism.

Existenzielle Risiken

• Toby Ord (2020). The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
• Nick Bostrom (2013). Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Global Policy. 4(1): 15–31.

Peter Singers „Hunger, Wohlstand und Moral“

Ressourcen für den Studienführer: Peter Singers „Hunger, Wohlstand und Moral“

• Peter Singer (1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(3): 229–243.
• Peter Singer (2009). The Life You Can Save. (Ein kostenloses e-Book und Audiobuch der 10-Jahres-Jubiläumsausgabe gibt es auf www.thelifeyoucansave.org. Die deutsche Übersetzung gibt es kostenlos als e-Book oder Audiobuch auf https://effektiv-spenden.org/leben-retten-buch/.)
• Richard Y. Chappell & Helen Yetter-Chappell (2016). Virtue and Salience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94(3): 449–463.
• Andrew T. Forcehimes & Luke Semrau (2019). Beneficence: Does Agglomeration Matter? Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (1): 17-33.
• Frances Kamm (1999). Famine Ethics: The Problem of Distance in Morality and Singer’s Ethical Theory, in Singer and His Critics, hrsg. von Dale Jamieson, Oxford: Blackwell: 174–203.
• William MacAskill (2019). Aid Scepticism and Effective Altruism. Journal of Practical Ethics, 7(1): 49–60.
• Richard Miller (2004). Beneficence, Duty and Distance. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 32(4): 357–383.
• Theron Pummer (2023). The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism. Oxford University Press.
• William Sin (2010). Trivial Sacrifices, Great Demands. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (1): 3-15.
• Michael Slote (2007). Famine, Affluence, and Virtue, in Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, hrsg. von Rebecca L. Walker und Philip J. Ivanhoe, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 279–296.
• Aksel Braanen Sterri & Ole Martin Moen (2021). The ethics of emergencies. Philosophical Studies, 178 (8): 2621–2634.
• Jordan Arthur Thomson (2021). Relief from Rescue. Philosophical Studies 179 (4): 1221-1239.
• Travis Timmerman (2015). Sometimes there is nothing wrong with letting a child drown. Analysis, 75(2): 204–212.
• Peter Unger (1996). Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence. Oxford University Press.